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Two economic problems contributed to the political 
upheavals which gave rise to the neo-conservative ex-
periences in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay: galloping 
inflation and disequilibria in their external accounts. 
To be sure, these three countries had long tolerated, if 
not learned to live with inflation. Indexing was wide-
spread, and most economic agents had long come to 
think in real, and not nominal terms. Yet the efficacy 
of such instruments was seriously eroded when triple 
digit inflation beset them. The costs of 600% inflation 
in Chile (1973), 300% in Argentina (1975), and close to 
100% in Uruguay (1973) and the fear of hyperinfla-
tion made each of them, especially the first two, assign 
top priority from the very beginning to stabilization 
policies. 
Not only were these countries beset with un-
precedented rates of inflation, but with serious dis-
equilibria in external accounts as well: the deficit on 
current account at the onset of the new regimes 
ranged from 20% of the value of exports of goods and 
services (Chile) and 27% (Uruguay) to 37% (Argenti-
na); and their debt-to-export ratios were among the 
highest of Latin America at the time: 1.7 (Uruguay), 
1.9 (Argentina), and 2.5 (Chile). 
I 
The monetarist approach 
to stabilization; Inflation as a 
monetary phenomenon 
The debate concerning the causes of inflation in 
the Southern Cone traditionally centered about 
two schools of thought: the monetarist and the 
structuralist.1 Monetarists attributed inflation to 
an overexpansion of the money supply, normally 
the result of fiscal deficits. The solution was to 
correct such maladjustments and slow down the 
expansion of credit. Structuralists, on the other 
hand, while not challenging the general relation-
ship between fiscal deficits, monetary expansion 
and inflation, affirmed that such an expansion 
was endogenous. That is to say, the monetary 
authorities often found themselves forced to in-
crease the money supply in order to avoid falls in 
the product due to more deep-seated (structural) 
shortfalls: for example, the (allegedly) low price 
elasticity of exports and of agricultural output 
made these economies extremely vulnerable to 
disequilibria originating in these sectors. Hence, 
the a t tempt to overcome the negative con-
sequences of such bottlenecks on the rest of the 
economy generated pressure to expand credit. 
Thus, any attempt to eliminate inflation without 
overcoming these structural bottlenecks would 
have either only passing success or would lead 
to recession. 
While it is true, as monetarists argued, that in 
the Southern Cone there has been a very close 
relation in the long run between the rate of infla-
tion and the growth of the money supply, in the 
short run this has not always been the case (see 
table 1). 
This is the basis for the structuralists' argu-
ments that in order to stop inflation it would not 
be enough to reduce fiscal deficits and slow down 
the growth of money supply, since the velocity of 
money could fluctuate in a compensatory fashion 
and, given the existing rigidities and bottlenecks 
in the economy, the deceleration in the rate of 
growth of aggregate demand (Mv) could slow 
'This controversy occupied a good part of the debate 
concerning inflation right through the end of the 1960s. The 
literature is extensive. See, for example, the articles by 
Oliveira Campos (1961), Felix (1961), Grünwald (1961), Baer 
and Kertenetzky (editors) (1964) and F.CLAC (1962). 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the stabiliza-
tion and adjustment policies pursued by each country; 
to establish at what cost, in terms of output and income 
distribution, these disequilibria were corrected; and to 
determine to what extent these costs were avoidable or 
not, and if so, what specific policies were responsible 
for these failures. 
It goes without saying that no policy is ever purely a 
stabilization or purely an adjustment policy, for the 
problems of internal and external disequilibrium 
often come together, as they did at the onset of these 
neo-conservative experiences. Nevertheless, it is prob-
ably fair to say that in the first years, and specially in 
Argentina and Chile, the aim was stabilization, subject 
to a balance-of-payments constraint; whereas in the 
last years (1981 on) the aim was adjustment subject to 
an anti-inflationary constraint. Hence the analysis will 
stress the stabilization features of the first years and 
the adjustment process of recent years. 
*Staff member of the E<;LA<: Economic Development Divi-
sion. 
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Table 1 
SOUTHERN CONE: GROWTH OF MONEY, PRICES, AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1950-1970 















































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund (1976 and 1980); KC;I.AC (1983). 
either the rate of inflation (P) (the desired objec-
tive) and/or production (Q) (not desired).2 
Possibly because of the greater simplicity of 
the monetarist model, or possibly because of the 
insufficient operationality of the structuralist 
approach, the fact remains that the stabilization 
policies followed during the 1950s and early 
1960s tended to be monetarist in orientation. On 
2 The quantity identity states that money (M) multiplied 
by velocity (v) is equal to the level of prices (P) multiplied by 
the volume of output (Q). Consequently it is true by defini 
tion and by differentiation that M/M + v/v = P/P + Q/Q. The 
quantity theory in its traditional and simple form states that v 
is relatively constant. Consequently, M/M = P/P + Q/Q. If we 
suppose, at least for the short run, that the product remains 
constant, M/M = P/P (the best known expression of the quanti-
ty theory). As shown in figure I, the quantity theory showed 
excellent explicative power in the period 1950 through 1970 
for the three countries. Given the growth in money and 
product, the theory wottld have predicted a rate of inflation 
for the period of 20% in Argentina (as opposed to 24%); 33% 
in Chile (as opposed to 30%), and 20% (as opposed to 29%) in 
Uruguay. 
the other hand, because such stabilization pro-
grammes almost invariably resulted in recession, 
such an approach slowly fell into disgrace. 
Nevertheless, the monetary approach reap-
peared in the 1970s. For one thing the approach 
had been enriched theoretically. It was now 
recognized that velocity (that is to say, the recip-
rocal of the demand for money) varied; however, 
it was argued that it varied not in an unpredict-
able fashion, or in a fashion which automatically 
compensated monetary gowth, but rather that 
such a variation in velocity was stable or at least 
predictable. On the other hand, while it was 
recognized that it was not at all clear in what way a 
deceleration in nominal aggregate demand 
would divide itself in the short run between a 
slower rate of inflation and/or a recession ,3 it was 
argued that a recession could be avoided to the 
^Friedman (1970) himself states that this is the single 
most important problem to be resolved in modern macroeco-
nomics. 
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extent that inflation was correctly anticipated. 
Secondly, and possibly more decisively in prac-
tice, given the urgent need to combat tripledigit 
inflation, it seemed quite unconvincing to attri-
bute significant causality for such high inflation 
to structural factors, or to insist that it was in-
dispensable to eliminate them in order to avoid 
still higher inflation. 
Given the neo-conservatives' preference for 
the market and aversion to administrative con-
1. The logic of the approach 
Quantity identity, in its dynamic form, offers a 
good starting point to explain the stabilization 
policy of phase I in the three neo-conservative 
experiences of the Southern Cone: M/M + v/v = 
P/P + Q/Q. If one wants to slow inflation, one 
needs to slow down the growth in nominal aggre-
gate demand (Mv). Nevertheless, the relative im-
pact which such a deceleration in nominal aggre-
gate demand will have, be it on prices or on 
production, will very much depend on in-
flationary expectations.4 If such expectations are 
fairly uniform among the different economic 
agents and these coincide with the inflationary 
goal implicit in monetary policy, the decelaration 
in nominal aggregate demand will fall exclusively 
on prices (precisely what is desired). On the other 
hand, if there is a significant difference between 
the inflation expected and that consistent with 
monetary and fiscal policy, the deceleration in 
nominal aggregate demand will also fall on pro-
duction (precisely what we desire to avoid). In 
short, however high inflation might be, it is 
^To be sure, the demand for money does not depend 
solely on inflationary expectations, but rather, among other 
things, on its alternative uses. More specifically, the creation 
of an internal capital market was to create financial in-
struments of a highly liquid nature, paying good interest 
rates, and this was to affect the demand for money. At the 
same time, the supply of money was not easy to control either. 
trois, it is not at all surprising that these countries 
initially have adopted a monetarist approach, 
and more specifically the monetarist approach 
for a closed economy. With the passing of time, 
and with the increased opening of the economy, 
the approach was slowly modified and the key 
instrument came to be exchange policy. In any 
case, throughout the entire experience, the pre-
vailing spirit was that of minimizing administra-
tive intervention in the market. 
theoretically possible to bring it down without a 
fall in output.5 Problems emerge if in fact there 
are rigidities, especially as regards expectations, 
for these will slow timely adjustments to the new 
conditions which economic policy is trying to es-
tablish. 
In others words, if inflation is really nothing 
else than "too much money chasing too few 
goods", it is not at all clear why in order to bring 
down inflation it should be necessary to produce 
even fewer goods. To be sure, stabilization poli-
cies often end in recession, but this is not because it 
is inevitable; rather, it is a sign of failure, a failure 
to harmonize the expectations of economic 
agents with the inflationary goal implicit in the 
fiscal and monetary policies which the govern-
ment is carrying out. 
In the three experiences, serious efforts 
were made to avoid the formation of'erroneous' 
inflationary expectations. During the first phase 
efforts centered in the labour market, for if in-
5Thomas Sargent (1981) makes this point quite ex-
plicitly in arguing that the costs of checking inflation are 
proportional not to the rate of past inflation (the theory of 
inflationary "momentum") but to expected inflation (rational 
expectations). Thus, should the public believe that there has 
been a (permanent) change in the rules governing fiscal and 
monetary policy, and not just a transitory change, the cost of 
reducing inflation can be quite low. He cites as specific 
examples the cases of hyperinflation which were abruptly 
stopped after the First World War in Germany, Austria, 
Hungary and Poland, where the cost in terms of recession was 
either slight or non-existent. 
II 
Phase I - Monetarism for a closed economy 
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flationary expectations became incorporated 
into labour contracts, especially if they were 
based on past inflation, wage movements would 
become terribly rigid. Thus, for example, if both 
entrepreneurs and workers expected inflation to 
be higher than the rate aimed at by the Govern-
ment, labour costs would rise in line with them. If 
the Government persisted with its anti-inflation 
goals and followed the corresponding monetary 
and fiscal policy, real wages would rise more than 
expec ted , with negat ive consequences for 
employment and output. Thus, if the Govern-
ment failed to harmonize the inflation expected 
in wage contracts with that implicit in economic 
policy, it would inevitably be confronted with the 
fo l lowing d i l e m m a : e i t he r to ratify such 
erroneous expectations, easing up its monetary 
and fiscal policy at the cost of sacrificing its 
stabilization programme, or else persist in its 
stabilization goals, with a consonant restrictive 
economic policy, but at the expense of recession. 
We may call this the neo-classical variant of 
recession (as opposed to the neo-Keynesian one), 
inasmuch as unemployment and recession would 
be due to a rise in real labour costs. In other 
words, unemployment would be a reflection of a 
disequilibrium in the labour market and not, as 
in neo-Keynesian models, of a disequilibrium in 
the goods market. Thus ' for neo-conservatives 
any stabilization programme which seeks to 
avoid recession and unemployment must neces-
sar i ly i n c l u d e wage con t ro l s in o r d e r to 
harmonize wage readjustments with the in-
flationary goal set by the Government, for the 
market left to itself cannot adjust wages to com-
ing inflation, inasmuch as it cannot know in ad-
vance the seriousness with which the Government 
intends to apply its stabilization programme. Any 
doubt as to this would inevitably create rigidities 
in expectations and consequently lead to reces-
sion. 
For reasons of this sort, neo-conservatism in 
the Southern Cone justified the use of adminis-
trative controls on wages to adjust expectations.(> 
' 'This is not to suggest that there were not other motives 
behind wage controls. For example, in Uruguay many argued 
explicitly that wages ought to fall in the short run in order to 
increase profit margins and thus raise the heretofore low 
levels of savings and investment. It is also possible that some 
believed that real wages had exceeded equilibrium levels 
However, doubts as to the ability of the market to 
adjust rapidly in transition situations did not lead 
to the adoption of similar interventionist mea-
sures in other markets (for example, the goods or 
financial markets).7 There was apparently con-
fidence that competition would assure rapid and 
converging adjustments in goods prices and in-
terest rates, so that all possible disequilibria in 
such markets would be quite transitory. 
2. The policies 
Inasmuch as inflation was considered to be fun-
damentally a monetary phenomenon, the key 
instrument in reducing it was the control of the 
monetary supply. However, in order to avoid or 
minimize recessive costs, control of the money 
supply had to be accompanied by wage controls. 
Moreover, a deceleration in the growth of 
monetary variables required a reduction in the 
fiscal deficit, all the more so given the magni-
tudes involved at the beginning of the neo-
conservative experiencies (fiscal deficits ranged 
between 4% and 10% of CDP). This implied an 
increase in the prices of public services, increased 
taxes and reductions in current expenditures 
(principally wages) in all three countries and, 
moreover, in Chile, a decline in public invest-
ment. 
According to the monetary framework such 
measures were the sine qua non for reducing infla-
during the periods of Perón in Argentina and Allende in 
Chile (the periods immediately preceding the onset of neo-
conservatism). In point of fact, however, this was not the 
case in Chile, since real wages had already fallen by over 15% 
with respect to 1970 levels in the last year of Allende's 
administration. This argument is possibly somewhat more 
plausible in Argentina, since real wages grew 11% between 
1970 and 1975, whereas per capita output grew only 8%. 
Nevertheless, even if it were true, given the rather small 
magnitudes involved the need of adjustment would have 
been minimal, Finally, there is no doubt that trade union 
power was looked upon with great suspicion, both for politi-
cal as well as ideological reasons, for unions had been an 
important base of support of the preceding governments in 
Argentina and Chile. Moreover, the neo-conservatives 
tended to look upon labour unions as no more than in-
struments of incipient monopolistic control. Therefore, they 
tended to believe that wages had been artificially raised for a 
long period of time. 
7Exchange-rate control was justified for other reasons: 
the need to have some reference price in the economy, with 
respect to which all other prices could freely adjust. 
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tion. They were also accompanied by two other 
measures which would prove to be of paramount 
importance in the future evolution of these 
economies. First of all, from the very beginning 
the three countries faced serious external dis-
equilibria which required real devaluations 
(Chile and Uruguay) or the maintenance of a 
high real exchange rate (Argentina had recently 
devalued). It is important to note, however, that 
in order to improve the trade balance it is not 
necessary to depress domestic production in 
order to lower imports. What is required is to 
reduce domestic spending and switch output to-
wards tradeables (by means of devaluation and/ 
or an appropriate trade policy), substituting (not 
simply reducing) imports and promoting ex-
ports. 
To the extent to which domestic spending 
(and income) has to be compressed, generally 
speaking one would expect a corresponding de-
cline in real wages. The worsening in the terms of 
t r a d e which A r g e n t i n a and Uruguay ex-
perienced from the very beginning, and Chile as 
of the end of 1974, would thus necessarily in-
volve some decline, though modest, in real 
wages.8 
Secondly, there existed a widespread system 
of price controls in the three countries. As a 
result relative prices were severely distorted 
(creating downward pressure on food prices re-
lative to industrial goods) and inflation was 
repressed.9 For these reasons price controls were 
eliminated in all three countries, so that prices 
would be more realistic. This policy was radical 
and abrupt in Chile, gradual in Uruguay, and 
erratic in Argentina. 
Thus , the policy pursued in these three 
countries from the very beginning did not limit 
8It is important to note that in none of the cases analysed 
did the deterioration in the terms of trade exceed the equiva-
lent of 6% of tiDP. Therefore, a similar decline in real wages 
should have maintained a neutral income distribution. 
However, inasmuch as the wage decline was far in excess of 
this, there must be other factors which explain the bulk of the 
fall in real wages, not just the adjustment to the external 
shock. 
^Especially in Chile at the end of 1973, the repressed 
inflation was so severe that a generalized shortage of prod-
ucts emerged, not so much because output had declined but 
because there was an excess of money, capable of buying far 
more than the economy was able to produce at the then 
prevailing controlled prices. 
itself solely to the fight against inflation or to 
tackling short-term problems; rather, in differ-
ing degrees, each country made serious attempts 
to restore equilibria in the external sector and 
correct the distorted system of relative prices. 
3. The results 
External disequilibria significantly improved 
during the first phase and inflation was reduced, 
although at a much slower pace than anticipated 
and at the cost of a sharp fall in real wages (of the 
order of 25% to 30% with respect to the normal 
or historical levels) and of a severe recession 
(Chile) or stagnation (Argentina). Only Uruguay 
avoided a deterioration in its level of activity, 
thanks to the strong increase in public invest-
ment and in exports, which more than com-
pensated for the decline in domestic consump-
tion. 
As far as inflation is concerned, the policies 
pursued resulted in important reductions in the 
Fiscal deficit and the rate of expansion of the 
money supply (see table 2). The fiscal deficit fell 
from 9% to 3% of GDP in Argentina (between 
1975-1976 and 1978); from 25% to 2% in Chile 
(between 1973 and 1976), and from 4% to 1% in 
Uruguay (between 1973-1974 and 1978). The 
annual growth of Mt in the same period de-
celerated from 250% to 140% in Argentina, from 
260% to 220% in Chile, and from 70% to 55% in 
Uruguay. As a result of restrictive monetary, fis-
cal and wage policies, inflation fell sharply: from 
rates of the order of 300% during the last pre-
neo-,conservative year in Argentina to 175% at 
the end of phase I, 1978; in Chile from 440% to 
230% between 1973 and 1976, and in Uruguay 
from close to 90% in 1973-1974 to 45% in 1978. 
As might have been expected, there was a 
significant correlation between the fiscal deficit, 
monetary expansion and the rate of inflation (see 
Figure I); high rates of inflation were accompa-
nied by large fiscal deficits and very strong 
monetary growth, whereas low rates of inflation 
coincided with lower deficits and rather modest 
monetary expansion. Nonetheless, these rela-
tionships were fairly loose in the short run. 
It is reasonable to suppose that in periods of 
accelerating inflation the velocity of circulation 
of money will rise because of inflationary ex-
pectations, so that the rate of growth of prices will 
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Figure I 
INFLATION (P), MONETARY EXPANSION <M) 
AND FISCAL DEFICIT (DEF F/GDP) 
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be greater than that of monetary variables. 
Nevertheless, during this period (above all in 
Chile) prices appear to have risen not so much 
because of demand pressures as because of price 
decisions taken by the producers themselves in 
anticipation of a demand for goods which never 
materialized. For that reason, for example, the 
increase in prices in the first year (1974) of 
Chile's neo-conservative experiment exceeded 
the increase in money supply by almost 50%. 
Once the inflationary process reversed itself, 
the contrary should have taken place, that is to 
say, expectations of decelerating inflation should 
have increased the demand for money, so that 
prices would rise less rapidly than the growth of 
money supply. This did not take place, however, 
in Argentina or in Chile. On the contrary, in the 
following years of phase I, though inflation 
slowed, it continued to advance at a rate well in 
excess of the growth of the money supply (see 
figure I). Consequently, during the three years 
of phase I, stabilization, the increase in prices 
exceeded the expansion of the money supply by 
114% in Chile and by 25% in Argentina. 
This resistance to a downward trend in the 
rate of price rises is attributable to the fact that the 
entrepreneurial sector harboured inflationary 
expectations which were higher than those fore-
seen by the Government in its monetary, fiscal 
and wage policies. The sharp devaluations, the 
sudden freeing of prices, the unexpectedly high 
domestic interest rates and the general un-
certainty aroused by so many imbalances and 
policy changes upset the inflationary ex-
pectations of the entrepreneurs, who, because of 
the scant competition they faced, had previously 
had ample liberty to impose their expectations on 
prices. 
In other words, the mixing of the objectives 
of balancing the external accounts and correct-
ing the distortions in the system of relative prices, 
on the one hand, and achieving stabilization, on 
the other, thwarted the attempt to check inflation 
without causing a recession. It is not that a reces-
sion was inherent in the pursuit of these objec-
tives, but rather that the combination of these 
with the use of instruments for their attainment 
which took no account of their repercussions on 
the other goals involved the risk that the slowing-
down of demand would affect not only inflation 
but also the level of activity. 
Moreover, the assumption that inflationary 
expectations express themselves solely or princi-
pally in the labour market through pressures for 
wage increases is rather doubtful, at least from a 
theoretical point of view. The validity of this 
assumption is brought further into question if 
one takes into account the fact that the policy was 
intended simultaneously to achieve the follow-
ing: i) bring about a real devaluation, which im-
plied raising the relative price of tradeables, and 
ii) raise, by way of price liberalization, the relative 
prices of goods previously controlled (generally 
speaking, foodstuffs). Moreover, inasmuch as 
the public could not know how much of the 
nominal devaluation was intended to be real (that 
is to say, how much would correspond to a rela-
tive improvement) and how much would be 
nominal (a purely inflationary increase), and nor 
could it know how long the policy of price 
liberalization would last (indeed, Argentina res-
tored price controls within the year), it is easy to 
understand why producers set their prices, not in 
accordance with current demand or prevailing 
wage costs, but in accordance with what they 
expected these to be in the future. These vari-
ables are of course influenced not only by the 
cost of labour,10 but also the expected cost of 
importing, the rate of devaluation, the level of 
real interest rates, the evolution of public service 
prices, the evolution of prices heretofore con-
trolled, and expectations regarding the be-
haviour of other prices, etc.11 
'"High interest rates affected not only inflationary ex-
pectations but also production costs, thus pressuring prices 
upwards, at least in the first instance. In the short run, rather 
than inducing the sale of inventories, high interest rates and 
consequently increased Financial costs tended to be passed on 
to prices (see Cavallo (1977)). 
1
 ' Referring to Frenkel (1979) and Ramos (1977), Foxley 
(1982) pointed out: "In Argentina, Chile and Uruguay dou-
ble and triple-digit inflation was experienced before and 
during the first years of the stabilization programme. It is 
precisely this type of context which is characterized by im-
perfect information, by uncertainty with respect to the future 
evolution of prices, and by huge risk, and in which the above 
factors become determining elements of the price decisions 
adopted by firms. Profit margins then become a function of 
expected inflation, and of the uncertainty and risk involved. 
During the phase of very high inflation, of maximum un-
certainty and disequilibrium in the economy, prices become 
relatively autonomous, not only with respect to demand but 
also with respect to cost pressures". 
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To the extent to which the inflationary ex-
pectations of producers significantly exceeded 
the rate of inflation implicit in monetary and 
fiscal policy, the deceleration in nominal aggre-
gate demand would fall on output (something 
undesirable) and not only on prices. If this were 
the case, then monetary and fiscal stabilization 
policy would prove to be too tight, and this was 
exactly what occurred. As a result there was a 
tendency towards the following: Í) too little 
money for the level of prices which in fact pre-
vailed (that is to say, real interest rates were too 
high); ii) real wages were too low, and iii) the level 
of output and employment was below the pro-
ductive capacity of the country (that is to say, 
there was a recession).12 
Had the divergence between the inflationary 
expectations of the public and the rate of infla-
tion implicit in economic policy been quickly cor-
rected, the contraction in internal demand would 
have been harmless. Unfortunately, inflationary 
expectations adjusted quite slowly, thereby pro-
longing and worsening the recession. In-
flationary expectations adjusted slowly, since 
national income was redistributed towards pro-
ducers: a fact which served to cushion, if not fully 
compensate, the costs of their erroneous price-
setting policy.13 In short, what producers lost by 
virtue of lower sales they made up via prices and 
margins higher than the equilibrium levels. This 
explains why the disadjustment between in-
flationary expectations and the inflation implicit 
in the economic policy lasted so long (see table 3). 
As a result of this 'rigidity' in inflationary 
expectations, prices remained well above 
equilibria, so that internal demand was in-
sufficient to absorb all ofthe installed production 
capacity. The economies thus tended to fall into 
'^Farmers had fewer possibilities of setting their prices 
in accordance with inflationary expectations, either because 
farm goods are perishables subject to high storage and con-
servation costs or because this is a more competitive sector. 
The fact remains that the relative improvement ¡n agricultu-
ral prices did not take place to the extent expected. 
13To be sure, this is not a situation which can be main-
tained in the long run, at least in competitive markets, for 
each firm can improve its profits by lowering its prices and 
thus increasing its sales. Nevertheless, in periods of recession 
as in this case, with prices in disequilibrum, this effect op-
erated slowly, for firms tended to see the demand for their 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Note: The variations in the index indicate whether the share 
of labour in gross domestic income has improved (above 100) 
or worsened (below 100) with respect to the base year. 
A = The index is defined as f S R HO)
 t w n e r e SR = real 
wage; O = index of the number of employed; Y = gross 
domestic income (gross domestic product adjusted by 
the terms-of-trade effect). 
B = An index defined as above (A), but which deflates by 
gross domestic product instead of gross domestic in-
come. 
aFirst 8 months of 1983. 
recession. This phenomenon was further aggra-
vated in Chile by the sharp fall in public sector 
investment and external demand (inasmuch as 
the quantum of exports did not grow enough to 
compensate the very severe decline in the terms 
of trade). The cumulative effects of reduced con-
sumption (due to wage reductions) and invest-
ment (cutbacks in public investment and a de-
cline in private investment) and the fall in ex-
ternal demand resulted in a very sharp economic 
contraction. Thus, per capita GDP in Chile fell 
13% between 1973 and 1976. In contrast, the 
restrictive effects of the stabilization policy were 
compensated in Argentina or even more than 
compensated in Uruguay by very sharp increases 
in public investment and in the volume of ex-
ports. Thus, in these two countries overall de-
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mand was reoriented from domestic consump-
tion to investment and exports, but it did not go 
down. 
T h e differences in the behaviour of employ-
ment during the first phase in each of these 
three countries is largely explained by the very 
different evolution of their respective output 
and not by the trajectory of real wages, which was 
quite similar in the three (that is to say, a sharp 
fall). This is because in situations of product mar-
ket disequilibria, where at the prevailing but in-
flated level of prices one cannot sell all one 
wishes, the demand for labour is no longer a 
function of wage costs so much as of the level of 
sales. Insofar as sales declined (Chile) or did not 
grow (Argentina), the demand for labour also 
fell or failed to grow, for however much real 
wages had fallen, the opportunity cost of unused 
machines in factories had fallen even more (it was 
virtually zero). As a result, the prime effect of the 
fall in wages was to reduce domestic demand for 
goods, rather than to induce the increased hiring 
of labour because of its lower cost. This would 
explain why in subsequent years the growth of 
employment in Chile coincided with increases 
and not declines in real wages. In Uruguay, in 
contrast, where the product grew despite the fall 
in domestic consumption, employment also ex-
panded. That is to say, the unemployment which 
was generated in this phase was not so much a 
symptom of a disequilibrium in the labour mar-
ket —whose resolution would have required a 
further lowering of real wages— but rather was a 
result of a disequilibrium in the goods market 
(inflated prices with depressed sales). Con-
sequently, the employment problem could not be 
resolved until the basic disequilibrium affecting 
the goods market was corrected.M Notwithstand-
ing the high rate of inflation, unemployment was 
due to a lack of aggregate demand, and the prob-
lem thus was not so much price rigidity as the 
rigidity in inflationary expectations, which 
meant that inflation went down much more slow-
ly than the rate implicit in the monetary, fiscal 
and wage policies being pursued by the Govern-
ment. 
Ill 
Phase II - The monetary approach to the balance of payments 
1. The logic of this approach 
T h e approach to stabilization was modified as a 
result of the failure of inflationary expectations 
to adjust rapidly enough, which limited the de-
gree to which money supply could be decelerated 
without incurring excessively severe costs in 
terms of recession. Efforts began to focus on 
active exchange policy; monetary policy then be-
came passive, being determined by the evolution 
of the balance-of-payments surplus. The ex-
change rate would thenceforth be devalued 
according to a pre-established programme 
rather than passively in accordance with past in-
flation. It was thought that in this way ex-
pectations could be brought into line with or at 
least rapidly adjusted to the inflationary goal im-
plicit in government policy. Thus the immediate 
objective of exchange policy became the control 
of inflation and no longer the maintenance of the 
exchange rate in real terms. 
To be sure, it was not considered necessary to 
lower the real rate of exchange in order to slow 
inflation. Rather, it was hoped and believed that 
the announcement and application of this policy 
change would demonstrate clearly to economic 
agents the seriousness with which the goverment 
intended to pursue its anti-inflationary goal, and 
so bring inflationary expectations rapidly down 
to the rate of devaluation. Since the latter was 
programmed to decelerate, the rate of inflation 
14The employment problem was less severe in Argenti-
na, since output there did not fall but simply stagnated. 
Moreover, in Argentina other more specific factors came into 
play to reduce the employment problem; namely, the dis-
placement of foreign labour and the big increase in self-
employment. 
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could be expected quickly to equalize the rate of 
devaluation (or the target inflation).15 If this was 
achieved, the price disequilibria could be cor-
rected without setting off a recession, while 
maintaining the real rate of exchange. 
Exchange policy was expected to influence 
the behaviour of prices not only by moderating 
expectations, but also more directly: at least in-
sofar as tradeables were concerned, it would tend 
to limit the price of domestic products to that of 
the imports competing with them. For, at this 
stage, the three economies had substantially open-
ed up imports, so that domestic prices had a 
ceiling given by the international price of the 
imported goods plus transport, tariffs and retail-
ing costs. This ceiling was the so-called "law of 
one price". Regardless of what the inflationary 
expectations of producers were, the price of 
domestic goods would necessarily have to con-
verge towards this single price in the long run. 
The liberalization of the domestic capital market, 
however, had created substitutes for money 
which made it increasingly difficult to control the 
money supply. These difficulties were further 
complicated by the progressive liberalization of 
the inflow of capital, with greater financial open-
ing up to the outside world. Money growth began 
to be explained largely by exchange operations, 
and not, as in the past, principally by the expan-
sion of internal credit or treasury financing. 
Thus, the fact that control of the money supply 
became increasingly difficult with financial 
liberalization was a further argument on behalf 
of this new exchange policy. 
The monetary approach to the balance of 
payments provided the underlying theoretical 
basis for this policy change. According to this 
view, differences in the amount of money de-
manded and supplied are resolved through the 
balance of payments {and not by changes in pro-
duction). For example, given a certain demand 
for monetary balances, if the supply of internal 
credit were to contract, the domestic interest rate 
would rise. Two adjustment mechanisms would 
then automatically come into play to resolve this 
15Strictly speaking, the rate of inflation would fall to that 
equal to the algebraic sum of the devaluation and the rate of 
international inflation. This sum would be the equivalent of 
the inflationary goal. 
difference. If the capital account were open, 
capital would come in, increasing the in-
ternational reserves, till the supply of money came 
to equal the amount of money demanded and the 
initial monetary restriction ended up determin-
ing not the amount of money in hand but only its 
composition (between internal and external cred-
it). On the other hand, were the capital account 
to be closed, the increase in domestic interest 
rates would lower the demand for goods, reduc-
ing imports, producing a surplus on the trade 
balance, and thus augmenting reserves and the 
money supply. If that did not take place, the 
price of domestic goods would fall, generating a 
trade surplus, increasing reserves, and thus ex-
panding the supply of money to the level de-
manded. Implicit in this approach, be it with 
open or closed capital accounts, is that dis-
equilibria between the supply and demand for 
money are resolved quickly and directly via 
prices and/or movements in the balance of pay-
ments. To ignore or minimize the possibility that 
the adjustment will take place to some extent at 
the cost of production is a central assumption 
which this approach has in common with the 
quantity theory of money, both in its earlier and 
in its more modern version, and it is this assump-
tion which distinguishes this approach from most 
others. To be sure, the speed with which the 
so-called "law of one price" operates in order to 
equalize16 internal and external rates of interest 
and the prices of domestic and imported goods is 
critical in determining the validity of the implicit 
assumption that variations in the product are a 
second-order mechanism for adjusting monetary 
imbalances. The high degree of international 
liquidity available between 1975 and 1979 made 
possible the fulfilment of the first condition; the 
increased trade openness which the three 
countries of the Southern Cone underwent (at 
least insofar as eliminating non-tariff barriers is 
concerned) also made plausible that the second 
condition be satisfied. 
l 6Rather than equalizing, these should approximate 
each other, for in the case of interest rates a surcharge would 
have to be added to cover country risk and the higher cost 
which domestic financial intermediation might entail. In the 
case of goods, one would have to add the cost of shipping, 
tariffs, and additional domestic retailing costs. 
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2. The measures applied 
In this theoretical approach, the crucial instru-
ment for stabilization was exchange rate policy. 
Domestic inflation was expected to converge to 
international inflation plus the rate of devalua-
tion. Moreover, domestic prices were expected to 
approach the level of international prices. At the 
end of phase I, however, the gap between domes-
tic and international prices continued to be very 
large, even after taking into account differences 
in prices arising from transport, tariffs and 
marketing costs. In the new phase, domestic in-
flation would have to be less than international 
inflation plus devaluation, at least until internal 
prices equalled external prices. This assumption, 
critical though it was, tended to be overlooked by 
policy-makers. 
At all events, it was expected that inflation 
would decline rapidly to the lower and declining 
rate of the devaluations. To be sure no one 
thought that exchange rates could be fixed im-
mediately, for so long as inflation continued to be 
high and the internal factors contributing to 
monetary expansion continued to persist, the 
economic agents would see such a fixing of the 
exchange rate as an unsustainable policy. For 
example, if M i were of the order of 10% of GDP 
and if a public deficit of the order of 5% of GM» 
were expected, money growth would necessarily 
have to be of the order of 50%, with a comparable 
rate of domestic inflation; consequently, a de-
valuation rate of much less than' 40% a year 
(assuming external inflation of 10%) would be 
considered unbelievable. On the other hand, 
once the public sector deficit had been elimin-
ated, there would be no reason (according to this 
approach) why the exchange rate could not be 
fixed so that the rate of domestic inflation very 
rapidly came to equal the international rate. In-
deed, if this approach were adopted, it would be 
necessary to fix the exchange rate to bring down 
inflation to the international rate. The key policy, 
then, was to devalue at diminishing rates (in 
order to affect expectations), according to a pre-
announced calendar (generally for 6 months). 
This policy was begun, at least partially, in Chile 
as of mid-1976, and in Argentina and Uruguay 
towards the end of 1978. The fiscal deficit was 
eliminated in Chile in 1979, whereupon, in 
accordance with the approach adopted, the ex-
change rate was fixed. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the fiscal deficit was also eliminated in Uru-
guay (in 1979), the authorities there preferred 
not to fix the exchange rate, for domestic infla-
tion was still of the order of 60% (compared with 
Chile's 33% and the international level of 10%). 
At the same time, given the situation of grow-
ing international liquidity prevailing in this 
second phase, the three Southern Cone countries 
increased their financial openness to the outside 
world in the hopes of achieving an even more 
rapid convergence of internal and external rates 
of interest. Simultaneously, although to a lesser 
extent, trade was further opened up (a good deal 
in Chile, moderately in Argentina, and hardly at 
all in Uruguay), as a means of stimulating com-
petition and thus further inducing prices to con-
verge rapidly to external ones. 
3. The results 
While the stabilization programme was in effect, 
both Chile (in 1981) and Uruguay (in 1982) man-
aged to lower inflation to international rates. 
This reduction was especially spectacular in the 
case of Chile, where six years before inflation had 
exceeded 200%. Inflation was almost halved in 
Argentina as compared with the first years of 
the conservative period, but nevertheless it 
never fell below 100% per year (see table 2). 
Argentina's inability to control its public def-
icit explains why it was unable to make further 
progress in this plane. Its deficit was never less 
than 3% of GDP (in 1981, the year of lowest infla-
tion (100%)), and it thereafter grew again to 
almost 4% of GDP17 . This fact could not fail to 
have a negative influence on the credibility of its 
exchange policy. For as Rodriguez (1983) has 
argued, it was very hard to believe that the an-
nounced policy of devaluing at a rate of 1% per 
month between July 1980 and May 1981 could 
be long sustained when at the same time the rate 
of inflation was five times that and the expected 
public deficit was of the order of 6% or 7% of GDP 
(implying an annual rate of inflation of the order 
of 80%). 
l7The data in table 2 referred to in the text correspond 
to the central government deficit. Were provincial gov-
ernments' deficits to be included —and these are important 
in Argentina— the deficit would increase by over 50%. 
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While an important component of the 
growth was merely recovery, nonetheless the 
growth in output in this period in all three 
countries was well above that experienced during 
phase I. Output per capita grew at a rate above 
2% per year in 1979 and 1980 in Argentina, as 
opposed to -0.9% per year in 1976-1978; in 
Chile it grew at a rate of 6% per year in 1977-
1981 as opposed to a fall of over 4% per year 
between 1974 and 1976; and in Uruguay it grew 
at over 5% per year in 1979 and 1980 versus a 
3.6% annual growth in 1975-1978. In other 
words, the phase II stabilization policy did not 
Indeed, the loss of competitiveness by 
domestic products that could be replaced by im-
ports was even greater than the above would 
suggest, for during this period tariffs were low-
ered, especially in Chile, and this meant that 
foreign goods became even cheaper than before 
in terms of local currency. Moreover, real wages 
—perhaps an even better indicator of the evolu-
tion of domestic costs— tended to recover during 
phase II. Once one adjusts for both of these 
phenomena the increased relative cost of domes-
tic goods with respect to international goods dur-
bring on any recession, at least in its first years. 
Inflation, however, fell much slower than the 
rate of devaluation, creating a problem which 
would become increasingly serious in the course 
of time. Because of this 'exchange lag', at the end 
of phase II —just before the non-scheduled 
maxi-devaluations— the prices of domestic prod-
ucts had risen well above those of their in-
ternational counterparts, exceeding them by 
50% in Argentina (between 1978 and 1980) and 
almost 30% both in Chile (between 1976 and 
1981) and Uruguay (between 1978 and 1981) 
(see table 4). 
ing phase II exceeded 50% in Uruguay and 
100% in Argentina and Chile (see table 4).lK 
18If the lag in the exchange rate had been compensated 
by an equivalent improvement in the terms of trade, no 
problem would have emerged, for the higher cost of domestic 
production would have been compensated by the increase in 
the international price of exports, thus maintaining their 
competitiveness. While there was a certain improvement in 
the terms of trade of Argentina in this period, it was not 
sufficient to compensate the strong increase in costs. In Chile 
for its part, the terms of trade worsened, so that the problem 
was accentuated rather than relieved. Finally, in Uruguay the 
terms of trade remained virtually constant. 
Table 4 
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 The lower the index, the cheaper are imports in domestic currency, and the 
more expensive are exports, 
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That the exchange rate lagged is a fact. Let us 
look at some hypotheses as to why this happened 
and why the rate of domestic inflation did not fall 
rapidly to the rate at which the exchange rate was 
being devalued, plus international inflation, but 
instead exceeded it by a considerable margin. 
i) The law of one price pertains directly and 
exclusively to tradeables, and these make up only 
half of the GDP. It is quite likely that many activi-
ties related to commerce, to the distribution of 
imports, to the financial system or to construc-
tion experienced excessive demand during this 
period, thus raising the prices of certain non-
tradeables. To the extend to which the producers 
of tradeables tried to maintain their historical 
relation to non-tradeables, this fact might have 
generated upward pressures on the prices of 
some tradeables. 
ii) Insofar as tradeables are concerned, there 
seems to have existed an excessive margin of 
tariff protection, so that reductions in tariffs did 
not, of themselves, bring about a proportional 
direct downward pressure on domestic prices. 
iii) Similarly, high transport costs (especially 
for products of little value and high volume) 
and/or high financial costs (especially for imports 
with low turnover) meant that domestic prices 
need not converge directly to international prices 
but rather equalled international prices plus the 
cost of transport, financial costs and tariffs. The 
price of the domestic good could, therefore, vary 
widely within a band or range of prices, the lower 
limit of which was given by the price at which the 
good would be imported from abroad, the upper 
by the price at which it would be exported.19 
iv) It was reasonable to expect, at the initial 
l !
'For example, and simply referring to transport costs 
and tariffs, a product which sold for US$ 100 in New York 
would cost US$ 110 in the Southern Cone, once transport 
costs were added. After adding the tariff, say 18%. its domes-
tic price could not be less than the equivalent of US$ 130. On 
the other hand, if it were desired to export the comparable 
domestic good, its selling price in New York would have to be 
no more than US$ 100, which would mean that its price in the 
Southern Cone, before transport would have to be no more 
than US$ 90. Indeed, it would have to cost even less were the 
US to place a tariff on the good. Hence, there would exist a 
wide band of prices between US$ 90 and US$ 130 within 
which the domestic good could fluctuate, without its being 
exported nor facing the competition of comparable imported 
goods. 
stages of trade liberalization, that small-scale im-
porters would set their price not at that equal to 
international prices plus tariffs, but rather at the 
level of domestic prices, or a bit less. In this way, 
price convergence took place, but upwards to 
domestic prices rather than downwards to in-
ternational prices. 
v) In a later stage, it seems reasonable to 
assume that many importers introduced dif-
ferentiated products which heretofore had not 
existed in the domestic market (for example, 
whisky) and which, although they took away part 
of the domestic market from local products (for 
example, the local alcoholic beverage), did not 
affect the latter's price in any significant fashion. 
In short, inasmuch as the domestic product was 
only an imperfect substitute of the imported 
good, it would be very difficult to avoid the loss of 
part of its market simply by lowering price, for 
the imported good attracted consumers because 
of its quality, variety or indeed its novelty, but not 
solely because of its price.20 
vi) At the same time, many goods were im-
ported by the very producers of the domestic 
goods with which they competed. To the extent 
to which these producers controlled the domestic 
market, they controlled the price both of the 
domestic and of the imported product, so that 
domestic prices would continue to remain above 
international prices, plus transport costs, plus 
tariffs, so long as there was insufficient competi-
tion in importing and distribution. Such com-
petition was fully achieved solely in relatively 
standardized products with high turnover, such 
as television sets, radios and cassette players. 
It must be acknowledged that all these 
reasons explain why domestic prices can remain 
above international prices plus tariff s and trans-
port costs for some time, although none of these 
arguments denies the fact that, given enough 
time, the convergence of domestic prices with 
international prices would eventually have to 
take place. The point is that such an adjustment 
could be quite slow and costly. 
In the Southern Cone countries, this delay 
made it increasingly likely that the government 
a, ,Moreover, it is important to note that, thanks to the 
strong inflow of capital and the consequently high level of 
a g g r e g a t e d e m a n d , domest ic o u t p u t tended to rise 
notwithstanding its loss of market share. 
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would find itself forced to abandon its exchange 
policy. The pressure became irresistible when it 
was seen that the Government could only con-
tinue with its exchange policy if it were able to 
keep up without interruption a massive inflow of 
foreign capital, which was doubtful. Thus, the 
economic agents sought rapid gains (through 
high prices) rather than slower profits and bigger 
investments (bigger sales at lower prices), hence 
making the anti-inflationary success of the ex-
change policy very short-lived. 
Obviously, the loss of competitiveness result-
ing from the exchange rate lag had negative con-
sequences for the balance of payments, inasmuch 
Table 5 
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as exports were discouraged and imports en-
couraged. Nevertheless, its pernicious effects 
were not noted immediately (table 5). For some 
time, the deficit on current account due to the 
exchange lag could be financed through the 
heavy affluence of external credit. However, 
capital inflows of the order of 5% and 10% of 
1. Its "logic" 
A price stabilization policy is never absolutely 
necessary, for inflation can be lived with if one so 
chooses. In the case of external disequilibria, 
however, adjustments need be made whether a 
country wants to or not. In the particular in-
stance of the Southern Cone countries, it would 
be fair to say that there was no deliberately 
chosen policy to adjust to external disequilibrium 
(except for the first few months of this phase), 
bur rather adjustment was forced on them by 
events. 
T h e lag in the exchange rate, which in-
c r ea s ing ly left domes t i c prices above in-
ternational ones, plus the extraordinarily high 
domestic interest rates, were steadily sapping 
domestic demand. To this was added an im-
minent large-scale domestic financial crisis. It 
was not possible for firms to keep on indefinitely 
paying real interest rates of the order of 20% per 
year, as they had been doing in preceding years 
while the economy grew at only modest rates, 
without risking insolvency and jeopardizing the 
financial system in its entirety. Because of firms' 
natural desire to postpone such a crisis, the de-
mand for credit became increasingly inelastic, 
and this, together with the waning of confidence 
in the exchange rate policy, raised real annual 
interest rates to 26% in Argentina, 40% in Uru-
guay, and 58% in Chile the year before the maxi-
devaluations were effected. 
Thus it was finally recognized that a real 
depreciation was indispensable to correct the ex-
ternal disequilibrium. Discussion centered on the 
most suitable means: either raise the price of 
GDP per year were clearly not sustainable in the 
long run. As confidence in the maintenance of 
the exchange policy weakened, it was necessary 
to offer extraordinarily high domestic interest 
rates (of the order of 3% to 4% real per month) in 
order to attract foreign capital or to impede 
capital flight. 
imported goods (expressed in domestic curren-
cy) to that of domestic goods via a devaluation, or 
lower the price of domestic goods to that of in-
ternational ones via deflation, with the exchange 
policy remaining unchanged. 
These two ways of achieving a real devalua-
tion are perfectly equivalent in theory, yet in 
practice they entail different risks. A devalua-
tion, even though intended simply to correct a 
distortion in relative prices, could set off in-
flationary expectations, resulting in an upward 
spiral in inflation rather than a once-and-for-all 
shift in prices. Deflation, on the other hand, en-
tails a very high risk of bringing about a severe 
recession and not just simply lowering prices 
and/or inflation, all the more so when the ex-
change lag to be corrected is, as it was then, of the 
order of 30% to 50%. Given the size of this dis-
equilibrium it was difficult to imagine that the 
entire fall in nominal aggregate demand could be 
absorbed immediately and completely by a sharp 
deceleration in domestic prices (which was re-
quired and desired). Rather it was to be expected 
that there would be at least some fall in the level 
of activity (which was of course not desired). 
2. The measures applied 
Nevertheless, policy makers in all three countries 
preferred to maintain their exchange policy 
rather than devalue, for they feared an explosive 
resurgence of inflation. And, after all, lower in-
flation was one of their principal achievements. 
Hence, they placed their hopes on what was 
called "automatic adjustment": that is to say, that 
the decelaration in monetary growth would 
IV 
Phase III - Adjustment (forced) to the external disequilibrium 
STABILIZATION AND ADJUSTMENT POLICIES I Joseph Ramos 101 
rapidly lower inflation to a rate less than that of 
devaluation plus international inflation.21 It 
should be noted that this option entailed no ac-
tion: all they needed to do was to maintain the 
exchange policy. If the balance of payments went 
in to deficit, monetary growth would auto-
matically slow. The impact of these measures was 
another matter: it was not certain whether they 
would affect only prices or have repercussions on 
the level of activity also. 
There was confidence, however, that the 
bulk, if not all, of the impact of a slowing-down in 
nominal aggregate demand would affect infla-
tion rather than production, thus bringing about 
a depreciation in real terms. 
3. The results 
T h e decelaration in nominal aggregate demand 
indeed lowered the rate of inflation in all three 
countries, but the real devaluation achieved by 
this means was not substantial (a few percentage 
points per semester): much too slow to correct 
significantly the large exchange lag accumulated 
in the past. In short, the bulk of the contraction in 
nominal aggregate demand fell not on prices, as 
desired, but on output. To be sure, imports were 
thus "automatically" curtailed, but at the cost of a 
severe recession in all three countries. 
The severity of the recession increased the 
p r e s s u r e s of domest ic p r o d u c e r s on gov-
ernments to abandon their exchange policy and 
replace it with a massive devaluation to correct 
relative prices quickly. This pressure became 
irresistible once it became clear that the only way 
the government could maintain its exchange 
2 l T h e r e was also asymmetry, both in theory as well as in 
practice, between these two options during the transition. 
The option of automatic adjustment or deflation, was limited 
by the fact that nominal interest rates cannot be negative, 
inasmuch as the mere holding of money pays a zero nominal 
rate of interest. This built-in inflexibility in the nominal rate 
of interest implies that deflation will automatically increase 
real rates of interest, for nominal rates of interest will neces-
sarily be positive. So if domestic prices actually/a//, because of 
deflation, the higher real interest rates and financial costs will 
be. Hence, deflation creates its own brake in the form of real 
interest rates, which will tend to force the bulk of the mone-
tary contraction on output rather than on prices. Moreover, 
this problem would be all the more serious, the greater was 
the lag in the exchange rate that needed correction, and 
consequently the greater the absolute fall in prices required. 
policy without an even more severe recession was 
to ensure that foreign capital continued to flow in 
massive proportions. Instead, however, the in-
flow began to go down. The decline in internal 
output, the deceleration in exports and the in-
creasing signs of a domestic financial crisis 
eroded what confidence there was left amongst 
foreign creditors as to the capacity of these 
countries to service their foreign debt, and the 
inflow of capital was sharply curtailed: it fell 60% 
in Argentina in 1981, 75% in Chile in 1982, 
and over 100% in Uruguay in 1982 (see table 6, 
line 1). 
It is difficult to exaggerate the adverse im-
pact which this contraction in capital flows im-
plied. Once interest and other factor payments 
were deducted, instead of being net importers of 
resources, the three Southern Cone countries 
became net exporters, in the year when they were 
finally forced to make maxi-devaluations (see 
table 6, line 3). The net transfer of resources was 
negative and of the order of 20% of exports in all 
three countries (see table 6, line 4), after having 
been strongly positive in previous years. 
Put differently, the change of sign of the net 
resource transfer in the year of the maxi-
devaluations was equivalent to a deterioration in 
the terms of trade of 25% in Argentina, 50% in 
Uruguay, and 80% in Chile. In the case of Chile, 
for example, this meant that instead of being able 
to import 80% more than the amount of its export 
earnings, as had happened in 1981 because of 
the positive effect of the net transfer of re-
sources, the negative net transfer of resources in 
1982 allowed Chile to import only 75% of the 
value of its export earnings (see figure II). 
Given the lag in the exchange rate, the un-
precedented reduction in capital inflows, and the 
severe internal recession and accompanying 
domestic financial crisis, there was no alternative 
but to proceed to a massive devaluation. Not only 
was there no longer any confidence in the sus-
tainability of the exchange policy, but once capi-
tal flows were curtailed, the domestic resources 
(foreign exchange reserves) which had made it 
possible to sustain the policy of deflation and 
automatic adjustment were rapidly run down. 
T h e maxi-devaluations were followed by 
sharp increases in the rate of inflation in all three 
countries. As the intensify of such inflation was 
considerably less than the devaluation, however, 
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Table 6 
SOUTHERN CONE: EVOLUTION OF NET AVAILABLE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND THEIR RELATIVE 
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY, 1980-1983 
(Millions of dollars and percentages) 
1. Net capital flows 
2. Interest and other 
factor payments 
3. Ne t t r a n s f e r s of 
f i n a n c i a l r e -
sources(l)-(2) 
4. Net t r a n s f e r s of 
f i n a n c i a l r e -
sources as a per-
c e n t a g e o f t h e 
value of exports of 
goods and services 
5. Varia t ion in the 
terms of trade as a 
percentage of the 
value of exports of 
goods and services 
6. Additional capac-
ity to import be-
cause of improve-
ment in items (4) 
and (5) 
7. Rate of growth of 
q u a n t u m of im-
ports 
8. Rate of growth of 
GDP 
Argentina Chile Uruguay 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1980 1981 1982 1983 1980 1981 1982 1983 
2 176 1 519 1 807 1 900 3.345 
1 607 3 701 4 755 4 800 1 028 
5 008 1096 440 811 
1 464 1 921 1 620 100 
494 - 1 8 2 40 
74 197 320 
569 -2 1 8 2 - 2 9 4 8 - 2 900 2 317 3 544 -825 - 1 1 0 711 420 - 3 7 9 - 2 8 0 
6% - 2 0 % - 3 3 % - 3 1 % 39% 64% - 1 6 % - 2 5 % 47% 25% - 2 5 % - 2 2 % 
12% - 9 % - 1 1 % - 3 % - 5 % - 1 4 % - 1 1 % 9% - 2 % - 6 % - 1 % 0% 
18% - 2 9 % - 4 4 % - 3 4 % 34% 50% - 2 7 % - 1 6 % 45% 19% - 2 6 % - 2 2 % 
40% - 1 2 % - 4 4 % - 1 7 % 13% 
1.1% - 5 . 9 % - 5 . 7 % 2.0% 7.8% 
20 - 3 6 % - 1 8 % 16% 
5.7% - 1 4 . 1 % - 0 . 5 % 5.8% 
-11% - 1 9 % - 3 9 % 
-0.1% - 8 . 7 % - 5 . 5 % 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official sources. 
the real exchange rate experienced a sharp im-
provement and much of the competitiveness lost 
during phase II was recovered (see table 4).22 
Thanks above all to the recession, the quan-
tum of imports fell so sharply that by 1983 the 
current account deficit in all three countries had 
been sharply reduced (from almost 90% of the 
value of exports in Chile in 1981 to less than 25% 
in 1983; from almost 50% in 1980 in Uruguay to 
7% in 1983; and in Argentina from over 40% in 
1980 and 1981 to just over 20% in 1983). 
Moreover, all three countries moved from severe 
a aIf we insist on this point it is simply because many, 
while recognizing that there was an important lag in the 
exchange rate which needed correction, argued that a de-
valuation would be ineffective, since it would rapidly be 
wiped out by a similar rise in the rate of inflation. This need 
only be so, however, if the starting point were an equilibrium 
situation, for then any attempt to improve the trade balance 
via a devaluation would soon be limited by a fully utilized 
productive capacity, thus leading to a price rise which would 
rapidly eliminate whatever transitory balance of trade im-
provement had taken place. Nor would deflation improve the 
trade balance, for lower prices would raise demand; since an 
equilibrium starting point and full employment is posited, 
prices would begin to rise, wiping out the deflation and the 
transitory gains in international competitiveness and in the 
balance of trade. 
A devaluation of the exchange rate or relative deflation 
can, however, be effective if the starting point is one of 
disequilibrium, in which domestic prices are above in-
ternational ones, for the resolution of this disequilibrium 
requires a real depreciation, either by raising the prices of 
international goods to those of comparable national ones 
(devaluation) or lowering the prices of domestic goods to 
international levels (deflation). The whole debate was really 
rather byzantine, however, for it was premised on a continu-
ing equilibrium, whereas a lag in the exchange rate implied 
precisely the contrary, 
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Figure II 
EXPORTS, NET TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES AND CAPACITY TO IMPORT 
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deficits in their balance of trade in 1980 and in 
1981 to trade surpluses in 1982. Once again, 
most of these improvements were due to the 
extraordinarily sharp reduction in the quantum 
of imports which the recession entailed. In the 
two years 1982 and 1983, this reduction was 45% 
in Chile, 55% in Argentina and 63% in Uruguay. 
A recession is of course an extraordinarily rapid 
method of lowering imports but it does so at the 
cost of a severe contraction in output. Con-
sequently, in the two or three years which this 
third phase of the adjustment lasted in the South-
ern Cone countries, output fell some 10% in each 
of the three countries (as opposed to 4% in the 
rest of the region) and unemployment sharply 
increased. 
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the in-
flow of foreign capital was sharply curtailed in 
these years, the level of foreign debt was ex-
traordinarily high at the end of 1983. The ratio 
of such debt to the value of exports of goods and 
services varied from a low of 3.3 in Uruguay to a 
high of 4.5 in Argentina, compared with an aver-
age of 2.7 for the rest of the region. To be sure, 
the Southern Cone countries had already been 
among the most highly indebted countries of 
Latin America when the neo-conservative ex-
periment began. What is truly remarkable is that 
they should not have slowed down their rate of 
indebtedness in the subsequent eight to ten years 
of strong export growth and firm allegiance to 
A clear distinction must be drawn between two 
types of stabilization policies: those which are 
intended principally to overcome internal dis-
equilibria (inflation and/or recession), and those 
designed to overcome external disequilibria 
(associated with deficits in the balance of pay-
ments). The most important distinction between 
the two is that the former need not be faced 
immediately (inflation can be lived with in-
definitely), whereas measures to deal with ex-
ternal disequilibria cannot be put off. The ba-
the principle of strict financial discipline. That 
they should still stand out amongst the most in-
debted countries of the region in 1983 certainly 
does not speak well of the economic liberalization 
policies which they pursued, and, in particular, 
their policy of financial liberalization. 
This latter seems to have heightened rather 
than reduced their dependence on foreign sav-
ings and consequently made them all the more 
vulnerable to swings in the international econ-
omy, for now they had to be prepared to offset 
unexpected movements in capital accounts as 
well as in their terns of trade. If their financial 
liberalization had only been furthered as the 
level of relative indebtedness approached more 
modest proportions this might have given them a 
greater degree of freedom with which to cope 
with the external disequilibria they faced in later 
years. Instead, rapid financial liberalization, in 
the face of an already very high level of debt 
added a further critical element serving to ac-
centuate rather than attenuate unexpected 
movements in their external accounts. Con-
sequently, rather than giving them more free-
dom, financial liberalization gave them even less. 
The adjustment (maxi-devaluation plus severe 
recession) was thus largely forced upon them 
rather than being a policy which they deliberately 
chose. Hence, the overindebtedness of phase II 
eventually led to the reversals in capital flows and 
the overadjustment of phase III. 
lance of payments is a binding restriction, similar 
to a budget restraint. 
Moreover, precisely because inflation can be 
lived with, depending on the country's tolerance, 
there is no reason (at least in theory) why an 
anti-inflationary stabilization policy need reduce 
output. To be sure, recession is all too often the 
(unwanted) result of a price stabilization policy, 
but this is not inevitable. In contrast, adjustment 
policies to deal with an external disequilibrium 
have an unavoidable cost for the country, since 
V 
Conclusions 
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they require that the quantum of goods and ser-
vices available to the country for its domestic use 
decline in order to permit it to meet its foreign 
commitments . What is avoidable, however 
( though unfortunately it often accompanies 
adjustment processes), is that output should also 
decline, since a drop in output is by no means a 
necessary nor desirable condition for reducing 
the goods available to the economy. On the con-
trary, the optimum adjustment policy would 
maintain or increase output but would reorient it 
from domestic to foreign use: exports would in-
crease and imports would decline, the latter be-
ing substituted, as needed, by domestic produc-
tion. Fur thermore , the output of tradeables 
would go down as that of non-tradeables rose. 
Thus , while adjustment inevitably implies a 
worsening, or at least a slowing down in the rate 
of growth, of the standard of living, it does not 
require a decline in the rate of growth of output. 
Hence, the challenge which faced the Southern 
Cone countries in the neo-conservative period 
was to avoid the unnecessary recession which 
of ten a c c o m p a n i e s ant i - inf la t ionary pro-
grammes or balance-of-payments adjustment 
processes. 
It is both theoretically and empirically be-
yond question that a decline in the rate of infla-
tion should be accompanied by a deceleration in 
monetary growth and a reduction in the fiscal 
deficit. But a stabilization policy will be succesful 
only to the extent to which the remaining prin-
cipal variables —prices, wages, exchange rates, 
interest rates— decelerate at the same pace. 
Theoretically, the mere announcement of the 
deceleration in the inflation rate should be 
enough to ensure that the remaining variables 
adjust immediately and become compatible with 
each other and with the programmed monetary 
and fiscal policy. In practice, however, in-
f la t ionary expec t a t i ons do no t adjust in-
stantaneously. For one thing, the public normally 
is rather skeptical. It wants to see results first 
before believing that inflation is going to fall as 
fast as the government projects. Because of 
this inertia in the adjustment of expectations, 
however, the level of prices normally remains 
above that implicit in the economic policy, thus 
leading to recession. Moreover, it is often neces-
sary not only to lower inflation but also to correct 
some relative prices, as was the case, in the three 
experiences we have examined, of the exchange 
rate, the prices of some public services, and/or 
the prices of agricultural products in relation to 
industrial goods. Unfortunately, the increase in 
these here tofore repressed prices is often 
(wrongly) considered by many private agents to 
be an indicator of probable inflation, and not 
simply the expression of a needed corrective 
adjustment in relative prices. This being so, in-
flationary expectations exceed the inflationary 
goal implicit in monetary and fiscal policy, there-
by forcing that policy to be eventually too restric-
tive and generating a recession. 
Hence, while it is certainly true that in order 
to bring down inflation it is imperative to control 
monetary expansion and reduce the fiscal deficit, 
no stabilization policy worth the name can be 
based on these instruments alone if it wishes to 
avoid the costs of recession. Such a policy must 
necessarily also try to harmonize, or guide, or 
control, but certainly not repress, the movement 
of the other principal economic variables (prices, 
wages, exchange rate, interest rate, etc.), in such 
a way that it is compatible with the rate of infla-
tion implicit in the monetary and fiscal policy 
programmed, for if some variables adjust more 
rapidly than others, a recession with regressive 
distributive consequences (at the expense of 
those variables which adjusted their prices down-
wards more rapidly) will ensure. 
The neo-conservative stabilization efforts in 
the Southern Cone successively followed two 
criteria, each of which focused on and controlled 
some of the principal economic variables, but not 
all. During the first phase, efforts were centered 
on direct control of the money supply and wages: 
these measures, together with natural market 
forces, were expected rapidly to bring internal 
prices (including interest rates) into line with the 
p rog rammed inflationary goal. During the 
second phase, efforts were centered on control-
ling the movements of the exchange rate and 
thereby slowing the growth of prices to a similar 
rate. In both cases there was some success in 
reducing inflation, but the cost was very high, 
inasmuch as the free variable, prices, adjusted far 
more slowly than the controlled variables, thus 
generating important disequilibria. 
In the first phase , t he p r inc ipa l dis-
equilibrium emerged in the goods market. Pi ices 
shot up far more than wages, giving rise to a 
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severe Keynesian-type recession in Chile and 
stagnation in Argentina. Only Uruguay was 
spared, thanks to its very high level of public 
investment and to the positive evolution of the 
external demand for its products. 
Although there is no reason why the cost 
—whatever its form— should be distributed un-
equally, the fact of the matter is that the "belt 
tightening" during phase I proved to be very 
uneven in all three countries. Income was sharp-
ly redistributed against wage earners, as can be 
seen by the very sharp fall in real wages (much 
sharper than the decline in the growth of nation-
al income) and, in the case of Chile, the cost was 
further accentuated by an unprecedented in-
crease in the unemployment rate to levels two to 
three times above historic rates. This uneven cost 
was the result of the policy instruments applied 
during phase I: that is to say, controlling wages 
and pursuing a tight monetary policy while 
allowing the inflationary expectations of produc-
ers to adjust much more slowly in the goods mar-
ket. Consequently, prices rose to inflated levels 
compared with wages. 
In the second phase, the principal dis-
equilibrium emerged in the market for foreign 
exchange, because domestic inflation declined 
much more slowly than the rate of devaluation. 
This lag in the exchange rate was due to the fact 
that the "law of one price" whereby domestic 
prices and interest rates should converge with 
international ones, acted extremely slowly. Con-
trary to what had been expected, the initial 
tendency was for international goods and loans 
to be priced at levels closer to their domestic 
counterparts, and not at their long-run values 
(their international prices, plus tariffs). In short, 
initial convergence was not downwards towards 
international prices and costs but upwards to-
wards domestic ones. 
Consequently, in phase II the lag in the ex-
change rate finally led to a serious disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments with recessive effects 
which were initially concealed by an unusually 
strong inflow of foreign capital but became 
obvious once such flows slowed at the end of 
phase II. The slowness of domestic prices to de-
celerate and the aggravation of the exchange rate 
lag thereby rendered ever less believable the con-
tinuation of the exchange and stabilization poli-
cy, and this contributed to the eventual slowdown 
in the inflow of foreign capital and the con-
sequent abandonment of the exchange policy. 
Massive devaluations were thus made necessary 
in order to close the huge gap which existed 
between domestic and foreign prices. 
While this second phase lasted, that is to say, 
up until the maxi-devaluations, the distribution 
of income did tend to recover (partially), or at 
least come closer to the original distribution ex-
isting at the time these neo-conservative ex-
periences were initiated. Such an improvement 
took place because employment (Chile and Uru-
guay) and/or real wages (Argentina and Chile) 
tended to rise. The recovery in wages was partic-
ularly marked in Chile, inasmuch as wages were 
readjusted in accordance with past, not current, 
inflation, and this latter was rapidly decelerating. 
While it is undoubtedly true that capital in-
flows can mitigate balance of payments difficul-
ties and thus reduce unexpected exchange rate 
variations, it is likewise true that the sudden 
reduction in such inflows can itself create or ac-
centuate an external disequilibrium, forcing 
even more sizeable adjustments in the balance of 
trade. This is so because capital movements are 
sensitive not only to interest rate differentials 
and exchange lags but also, and more im-
portantly, they are sensitive to uncertainty con-
cerning the country's capacity to service its for-
eign debt. When such uncertainty arises, the mag-
nitude of the adjustment that must take place is 
all the greater, and the time it must be completed 
in is all the shorter. These dangers manifested 
themselves clearly in the three Southern Cone 
countries, since capital inflows proved to be high-
ly procyclical. During most of the period of pro-
grammed and pre-announced devaluations, 
capital inflows were sufficiently s trong to 
minimize or compensate the negative effects on 
output of a lag in the exchange rate, and so 
maintain strong aggregate demand. Inversely, 
however, once doubts were created as to a coun-
try's capacity to service its debt, capital inflows 
diminished sharply, thus forcing exceptionally 
rapid and strong (over) adjustment to the ex-
ternal disequilibrium. Consequently, not only 
was there over-indebtedness (excessive capital in-
flows) in phase II, as can be seen from the ex-
traordinarily high level which the ratio of debt to 
exports reached in all three countries, but there 
was overadjustment in phase III, for in this last 
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phase, all three countries were forced to adjust 
their economies not only to an external dis-
equilibrium on their trade balance, due to the lag 
in the exchange rate, but had also to adjust to the 
procyclical reduction in capital inflows, which 
both increased the magnitude of the needed 
adjustment and shortened the time frame in 
which it had to be effected. 
Hence, whereas in the last year of phase II 
the big capital inflows more than offset the move-
ments in the terms of trade and increased these 
countries' capacity to import by some 20% to 
40% of the value of their exports, once capital 
inflows receded and adjustment was forced upon 
them they were forced to make a net transfer of 
resources equivalent to 25% of the value of their 
exports. As a result, over a twelve-month period 
each of them was forced to reduce imports or 
increase exports by the equivalent of some 50% 
of the value of their exports. Moreover, since this 
had to be done in the course of a major in-
ternational recession, the brunt of the adjust-
ment had to be borne through a reduction in 
imports and not an expansion of exports. Con-
sequently, given such a sharp reversal in their 
capacity to import, it is not surprising that in the 
two years following their maxi-devaluations 
(1981/1982-1983) these economies'outputfell by 
the order of 15%. 
Obviously it would be desirable, in the face of 
external disequilibria, to have permanent access 
to the external capital market to soften and pro-
long the adjustment process and enable it to be 
based on expansion of the production of trade-
ables rather than on a reduction of output. In the 
case of the three Southern Cone countries, 
however, they were so heavily in debt when the 
final crisis broke out that capital flows dried up 
precisely when they needed them most: on the 
contrary, they became yet another variable to 
which they were forced to adjust. A devaluation 
taken earlier or possibly of even greater magni-
tude than that finally made might have suc-
ceeded in reducing imports at a lower cost in 
output. In view of the magnitude of the external 
imbalance and the short time available for 
correcting it, however, the devaluation was in any 
case less effective than it would have been if more 
time had been available. 
T h u s , unl ike a price stabilization pro-
gramme where a "shock" policy may be effective, 
especially for dealing with hyperinflation, there 
can generally be no efficient "shock" adjustment 
to external disequilibrium, since efficient adjust-
ment implies changes in real, not simply in 
monetary, variables. Thus gradual measures are 
vital. Efficient adjustment implies not just reduc-
ing the output of non-tradeables, which can be 
achieved quite quickly, but also increasing the 
output of tradeables, which is slower; it is not just 
a question of reducing the volume of imports, 
which is usually fast, but increasing exports and 
the output of import substitutes, and this is 
necessarily slower. 
Given the magnitude of the external dis-
equilibrium the Southern Cone countries faced 
and the brief time frame in which they had to 
close it, their adjustment was inevitably not effi-
cient. Its results were based almost exclusively 
on expenditure reduction (controlling demand, 
which can be effected with the requisite speed) 
rather than on expenditure switching (which in-
volves supply and production shifts, which are 
necessarily much slower), and this, of course, is 
the worst of all possible adjustments. In fact, the 
cost to the three countries of improving their 
trade balance by a total of US$ 16 billion in the 
first two years of application of their adjustment 
policies23 was the sacrifice of nearly US$ 37 
billion in lost production.24 In other words, the 
adjustment which took place was based much 
more on the reduction of expenditure than on its 
reallocation ("switching" policies), and it meant 
paying US$ 2.30 in lost production for every dol-
lar of foreign exchange saved. 
Therefore, the basic principle of an efficient 
policy for achieving adjustment to external dis-
equilibria with little or no decline in production is 
to weigh the cost of saving or generating foreign 
'^Argentina 1980-1982; Chile and Uruguay 1981-1983. 
a 4The improvement in the trade balance is measured 
for each of the two years of the adjustment process, as com-
pared with the base year (i.e., US$ 5 700 million for the three 
countries in the first year of adjustment and US$ 9 900 
million in the second, giving a total of almost US$ 16 billion in 
the two years). For its part, the cost consists of the growth of 
the product which did not take place (of the order of 3 1/2% 
per year), plus the fall registered (US$ 14 billion less product 
in the first year and another US$ 23 billion less in the second, 
giving a total sacrifice of the product of US$ 37 billion for the 
two years). 
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exchange th rough expendi ture "switching" 
policies with that of securing the same effect 
through the reduction of expenditure. This basic 
principle gives rise to at least three economic 
policy guidelines: 
1. Precisely because policies of restricting de-
mand can be expected to take effect more rapidly 
than those which reallocate expenditure, there is 
every justification for temporarily employing 
policies of marked "over-reallocation", both in 
order to discourage non-essential or replaceable 
imports and to promote exports. For the case of 
these three countries, this would mean that any 
combination of tariff surcharges or special ex-
port subsidies which saved or generated one dol-
lar of foreign exchange at a cost of less than 
US$ 2.30 of lost production (at the prevailing 
exchange rate) would have been preferable to 
the policy of over-reduction of expenditure 
actually followed. T h e incentives for "over-
reallocation" would only be transitory, for 
although the reallocation of production operates 
but slowly, it does take place in the end: once its 
effects begin to be felt with all their force, further 
special incentives would be unnecessary and 
their maintenance for an indefinite period would 
be inefficient. Fur thermore , since these in-
centives are transitory they should not be gener-
alized (that is to say, a still greater exchange rate 
devaluation would not be advisable); instead, the 
special export incentives and tariff surcharges 
should be selective, as a direct function of the 
short-term price elasticity of the exported or im-
ported product. 
2. A more efficient adjustment policy would 
call for the equalling of the incentives (or costs) 
for saving foreign exchange through import sub-
stitution and for generating it through export 
promotion. In view of the prevailing structure of 
incentives, especially in Argentina and Uruguay 
—high tariffs, plus few special expor t in-
centives— it would presumably be easier to earn 
additional foreign exchange by promoting ex-
ports than by increasing import substitution. 
3. The last element in this sketch of an ex-
pansive and not recessive adjustment policy 
would be the inadvisability of reducing the pro-
duction of non-tradeable goods until the output 
of tradeables has expanded to a similar degree. 
The traditional (recessive adjustment) policy, in 
contrast, generally assumes that the reduction of 
the former practically ensures the expansion of 
the latter (i.e., it assumes full use of installed 
capacity). The fact is that production of non-
tradeables usually falls all too easily and rapidly, 
whereas the expansion of tradeables production 
is neither quick nor certain. In the first two years 
of the adjustment process in the three countries, 
for example, production of non-tradeables 
plummeted —construction activity fell by 30%— 
without the resources thus freed being used to 
increase the output of tradeable goods. Indeed, 
the production of tradeables also fell (by over 
10%). Hence, in contrast with traditional pro-
grammes, it does not seem advisable to restrict 
construction or the production of other non-
tradeable goods until these resources are actually 
required for the output of tradeables. To do it 
earlier would be to save foreign exchange at an 
unjustifiably exaggerated cost (of the order of 
the reciprocal of the marginal propensity to im-
port, or, roughly speaking, at a cost which is 
approximately four times greater, in terms of lost 
production and at the prevailing exchange rate, 
than the total amount of foreign exchanged 
saved). 
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